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Abstract
Why do we observe proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain
types of countries instead of having progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral
FTA? We answer this question by exploring the enforceability of di¤erent types of FTAs through
comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an innitely repeated
game framework. We also search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are
sustainable under di¤erent conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, di¤erences in
country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accord-
ingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the
main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which we show to be the rst-best solution to the
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1. Introduction
The lack of a forcing authority in trade relations of world countries makes it di¢ cult to achieve a multilateral free trade
agreement (FTA) that increases world welfare. This creates a structural problem of rules in trade agreements that will
self-enforce the trading countries to achieve more liberal trade. In this paper, we study these self-enforcing rules with
asymmetric countries from the perspective of bilateral and multilateral FTAs. In particular, we attempt to nd an answer
to the question of "Why are FTAs bilateral/regional/preferential rather than multilateral?" Before we can answer this
question, since many trade models nd a multilateral FTA to be the rst-best solution, we need to know why bilateral FTAs
exist in the rst place. To better understand the characteristics of bilateral FTAs, consider Baier and Bergstrand (2004)
who empirically nd that the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a bilateral FTA are economically and signicantly
higher: (i) the closer in distance are two trading partners; (ii) the more remote a natural pair is from the rest of the world
(ROW); (iii) the larger and more similar economically (i.e. real GDPs) are two trading partners; (iv) the greater the
di¤erence in comparative advantages; and (v) the less is the di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries
relative to that of the ROW.
The empirical ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) above are consistent with 85% of the 286 bilateral FTAs existing
in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97% of the remaining 1145 pairs with no bilateral FTAs. Hence, to have credible
results, any trade model investigating bilateral FTAs should be consistent with these empirical ndings. We present such
an N -country-N -good partial equilibrium trade model by generalizing the 2-good-2-country model in Bond and Park
(2002) through considering possible interactions between country sizes, comparative advantage, and transportation costs.
For simplicity, we assume that the downward-sloped demand curve and upward-sloped supply curve of each good in
each country are linear in price of the good. We show that international trade between any two countries is achieved
through di¤erences in supply and demand structures of the countries. It follows that the equilibrium autarky price (for
each good) in any country depends on the individual country specic demand and supply structure, while the equilibrium
price (for each good) under international trade depends on the demand and supply structures of all countries together
with country-specic tari¤ rates and transportation costs. We let each country to receive all the tari¤ income for the
good that the country imports. Accordingly, the national welfare is dened as the weighted sum of consumer surplus,
producer surplus and tari¤ incomes. Using this denition in a welfare analysis, we estimate the policy weights (assigned to
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income across countries) that are consistent with the empirical ndings of
Baier and Bergstrand (2004) regarding bilateral FTAs. The estimation results suggest that the policy weight on producer
surplus is much higher than the others. Using the estimated policy weights, we investigate for the economic conditions of
our model under which bilateral versus multilateral FTAs may exist with self-enforcing rules.
In order to incorporate self-enforcement agreements into the model, we allow countries to get involved in a stationary
dynamic tari¤ game, i.e., countries play an innitely repeated game for tari¤ rates. In this game, each country is able
to compare future payo¤s out of a possible collusion (cooperation) with future payo¤s out of a possible deviation from
the agreement. In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement, the trade-o¤ between the gains from deviating from
an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the discounted expected future gains from collusion must be balanced in a way that the
latter should keep away countries from deviating. Within this picture, we ask the more-detailed question of this paper
as "Why do we observe proliferation of bilateral FTAs between certain types of countries instead of having progress in
attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA?" We answer this question rst by exploring the enforceability of
di¤erent types of FTAs through comparing the minimum discount factor that is necessary to sustain them. After having
such a minimum-discount-factor analysis, we go one step further by searching for globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade
agreements dened as the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under di¤erent conditions.
For the impatient reader, our results suggest that transportation costs, di¤erences in country sizes and comparative
advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA, which we show to be the globally rst-best solution for several
di¤erent cases of our model. Therefore, removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral
FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for countries to converge to each other (e.g., increasing
internal and international stability, reducing poverty, investing in transportation technology, international di¤usion of
production technology) should be the main tools.
Related Literature
Common questions that have been investigated in the literature are whether the trade liberalization is achieved through
bilateral/preferential agreements or multilateral agreements, whether preferential agreements are building blocks or stum-
bling blocks for multilateral agreements, and whether bilateralism or multilateralism is a better strategy for countries.
Since it is not possible to mention about all relevant studies, we will talk about a selected group of them that we think
as best comparable to this paper. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) study a competing-exporters model with three countries to
identify the di¤erent circumstances under which the preferential agreements can lead to multilateral agreements or block
them. Other studies that investigate the relation between preferential and multilateral agreements in di¤erent settings
are Bagwell and Staiger (1997a,b) (1999), Bond and Syropoulos (1995), and Bond, Syropoulos and Winters (2001). All
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of these studies assume that countries can commit tari¤ rates under preferential agreements, hence, only the multilateral
agreements must be self-enforcing, which makes bilateral versus multilateral FTAs hard to compare in terms of sustain-
ability. In our paper, preferential agreements must be self-enforcing as well in order to make such a comparison. Another
study is by Limao (2007) who investigates the e¤ects of preferential trade agreements on global free trade when countries
are motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues. Limao argues that the preferential agreements motivated by cooperation
in non-trade issues increase the cost of multilateral tari¤ reductions and, hence, decrease the likelihood of a multilateral
free trade agreement. Compared to Limao, our paper nds that bilateral (compared to multilateral) FTAs are easier to
sustain even in the absence of non-trade issues. Another recent study, Saggi and Yildiz (2010), focus on the comparison of
bilateralism and multilateralism through trade liberalization. They employ a competing-exporters model in which tari¤
rates are determined endogenously. They argue that when countries have symmetric endowments, both bilateralism and
multilateralism yield global free trade, but when countries are asymmetric in terms of endowments, global free trade is
stable (for a large set of parameters) only through bilateral agreements.1 This result is not consistent with the implications
of our model where bilateralism is always easier to sustain compared to multilateralism in an innitely repeated game
framework; nevertheless, our paper shows that a multilateral FTA with symmetric countries (i.e., countries with similar
sizes and comparative advantages in the absence of transport costs) is easier to sustain compared to a multilateral FTA
with asymmetric countries (i.e., countries with di¤erent sizes and comparative advantages in the existence of transport
costs).
The relation between transportation costs (i.e., geography) and trade agreements has been previously studied in the
literature starting with Viner (1950) who has mentioned departures from the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle
between countries within Europe going as far back as the nineteenth century.2 Nevertheless, instead of explaining these
agreements through trade costs, Viner has reasoned them to "close ties of sentiment and interest arising out of ethnological,
or cultural, or historical political a¢ liations". Other earlier studies such as Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) havent
mentioned about a possible e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade agreements either. Wonnacott and Wonnacott
1 In our model, countries do not compete over the goods that they export because each country exports only one good; i.e., when two countries
involve in a bilateral agreement, the non-member countries do not face discriminatory tari¤s in export markets. For a futher discussion on
the relationship between preferential and multilateral liberalization see also Bhagwati et al. (1999), Saggi (2006), and Karacaovali and Limao
(2007).
2As Panagariya (2000) states, MFN is the centerpiece of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT) that governs the international
trade in goods. In particular, MFN refers to the trade policy in which each World Trade Organization (WTO) member grants to all members
the same advantage, privilege, favor, or immunity that it grants to any other country.
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(1981), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Krugman (1991, 1993), Summers (1991), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), and Bhagwati
and Panagariya (1996) have attempted to nd whether or not proximity between countries have made regional agreements
more benecial compared to non-regional agreements. In particular, Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) assign an important
role to transportation costs in their analysis, but their study has been criticized by Berglas (1983) and Panagariya (1998)
in the sense that the transportation costs have to be too high in order to talk about the e¤ect of transportation costs on
regional trade agreements. However, in our paper, we show that even transportation costs up to 25% of source prices can
have signicant e¤ects and become an obstacle for a multilateral FTA in a repeated game framework. Besides, following
Krugman (1991), other studies such as Frankel (1997), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995), Frankel and Wei (1997) have also
advocated for the e¤ect of transportation costs on regional trade agreements. However, building on the earlier critique
in Bhagwati (1993) and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Panagariya (1997) has shown that transportation costs are
not di¤erent than any other costs and hence should not deserve any special attention in explaining the regional trade
agreements. Since transportation costs are exogenous in our paper, we accept that they are not di¤erent than any other
costs (e.g., standard gravity-equation costs other than tari¤s, such as cultural ties or networks), but the important point
we show is that they still have signicant e¤ects on the formation of FTAs.
In terms of methodology, the common question in the literature asked is whether tari¤ reductions with nearby partners
are welfare improving. Krugman (1991), Frankel Sten and Wei (1995), and Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) have examined
this particular question by considering whether exogenously given preferential tari¤ reductions are welfare improving in
a model where there are di¤erent levels of transport costs between trading partners. This approach has been extended
by Bond (2001) through considering self-enforcing agreements in a four-country endowment model. In particular, Bond
(2001) assumes that the world is divided into two continents, with two countries located on each continent. There is
a per unit cost on any good imported from a country on the other continent, but zero transportation cost on goods
coming from the country on the same continent. Bond shows that Nash equilibrium tari¤s on regional trading partners
are higher than those on the distant partners; one might anticipate that this fact would make it more di¢ cult to support
trade liberalization with nearby countries, because the incentive to deviate at a given agreement tari¤ would be higher.
However, this e¤ect is o¤set by the fact that the welfare level under regional free trade agreements is higher than that
with a distant partner. This is because free trade agreements with distant partners have higher external tari¤s against all
countries, which leads to lower world welfare under distant free trade agreements. In sum, Bond (2001) shows that the
equilibrium with regional trade agreements yields higher welfare. This paper follows a similar approach with Bond (2001)
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in terms of considering possible transport costs across countries, but our analysis di¤ers from his paper by considering (i)
an N -country-N -good model, (ii) a supply side in each country with di¤erent levels of comparative advantage and, hence,
trade through the search for minimum prices, and (iii) di¤erences in country sizes. These extensions imply di¤erent results
compared to the results in Bond (2001): A multilateral FTA leads to a higher global welfare even with moderate transport
costs (up to 25% of source prices), country size di¤erences (up to three times), and comparative advantage di¤erences (up
to two times); however, a multilateral FTA is always harder to sustain compared to a bilateral FTA.
2. The Model
We consider a partial-equilibrium international trade model populated by N countries and N goods. This an extended
version of the model by Bond and Park (2002) through considering transportation costs and increasing the number of
countries (from 2) to N in order to investigate the formation of possible bilateral versus multilateral FTAs. The model
considers asymmetries across countries in terms of their sizes, comparative advantages, and transportation costs. In terms
of notation, C = f1; : : : ; Ng represents the set of countries and Hji is related to variable H in terms of good i 2 f1; :::; Ng
in country j 2 f1; :::; Ng. The complete list of variables and parameters are given in Table 1 for convenience.
2.1. The Economic Environment
The demand for good i in country j is given as follows:
Dji = j (A Bpji)
where we assume that the demand curve is downward-sloping and linear in price of the good, pji is the price of good i in
country j, j  1 is a parameter by which we measure the relative size of country j; A > 0; and B > 0.3 Similarly, the
upward-sloping supply curve of good i in country j, which is also linear in price of the good, is given as follows:
Xji = j (ji + pji)
where ji  0 measures comparative advantage (i.e., a higher value of ji corresponds to a higher comparative advantage),
and  > 0. Note that in a special case of j = 1 for all j, we have N symmetric countries with the same size. According
3See Gehrels (1956-1957) and Lipsey (1957) for early theoretical models that compare the implications of zero elasticity of demand and non-
zero elasticity of demand. Also see Panagariya (2000) for a recent discussion on the implications of downward-sloped demand and upward-sloped
supply.
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to the supply and demand functions in each country, the autarky price of good i in country j, pji (a), is given by the
following expression:
pji(a) =
A  ji
 +B
Since we assume that A > 0 and ji  0 for all i and j, the autarky price is positive for each good in any country, i.e.,
pji(a) > 0.
Each country can impose specic tari¤s on its importables, with tjk denoting the tari¤ rate imposed by country j for
goods imported from country k (where tjj = 0 for all j). Moreover, trade between any two countries is up to an exogenous
symmetric iceberg transportation cost, with  jk denoting the cost from j to k (where  jj = 0 for all j). In order to ensure
that there is a single exporter of each good k, we assume that kk  jk > ( +B) (tjk +  jk).4 That is, because country
k is the lowest cost supplier (including trade costs) of good i for all countries (i.e., pji(a) > pki(a) + tjk +  jk when i = k
for all j 2 Cn fkg where Cn fkg is the set of all countries excluding country k), country k is the single exporter of good i.
Therefore, when trade is achieved, we can write the price of good k in country j by the following expression:
pjk = min
i
fpik + tji +  jig
= pkk + tjk +  jk
Note that if j = k, then trade costs are zero (i.e., tjk =  jk = 0), so that the price of the domestically produced good is
pkk = pjk in such a case.
The market clearing condition for good i can be written as follows:
NX
m=1
m (mk + pmk) =
NX
m=1
m (A Bpmk)
By using pmk = pkk + tmk + mk for all m 2 f1; : : : ; Ng, we can nd the source (i.e., factory gate) price of good i in
country k as follows when i = k:
pkk =
NX
m=1
m (A  mk   ( +B) (tmk + mk))
NX
m=1
m ( +B)
By the assumptions of the model introduced above, pkk is positive.
The volume of the imports of country j from country k is then given by the following expression:
Mjk(pjk) = j (A  jk   (B + ) pjk)
4We assume that any country k has enough supply of good k to satisfy the demand of good k in the global markets.
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where
pjk = pkk + tjk +  jk
=
NX
m=1
m (A  mk)
NX
m=1
m ( +B)
+
(tjk +  jk)
NX
m=1
m  
NX
m=1
m (tmk + mk)
NX
m=1
m
=
NX
m=1
m

A mk
+B + tjk +  jk   tmk   mk

NX
m=1
m
Note that the derivative of pjk with respect to tjk or  jk is positive since j  1 for all j; i.e., destination prices increase
in trade costs, and thus the volume of imports decreases in trade costs (and source prices) and increases in country sizes.
2.2. Optimal Tari¤ Rates
In order to go one step further and talk about optimal tari¤ rates in our analysis, we need an objective function for
each country, which will be the key to our policy analysis, below. The natural choice is, for sure, the national welfare
function, which is dened as the weighted sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari¤ incomes. As in the existing
literature, we let each country to receive all the tari¤ income for the good that the country imports. In particular, national
welfare for country j is expressed as follows:
Wj =
X
k
"
WCS
Z A=B
pjk
Djk (u) du+WPS
Z pjk
 jk=
Xjk (u) du
#
+WTI
X
k
tjkMjk(pjk) (2.1)
where
R A=B
pjk
Djk (u) du is the consumer surplus for good k in country j;
R pjk
 jk= Xjk (u) du is the producer surplus for
good k in country j; tjk = 0 if k = j, as before; WCS is the weight on consumer surplus, WPS is the weight on producer
surplus, and WTI is the weight on tari¤ income.
Given the tari¤ rates of other countries, in order to nd its optimal tari¤ rates (i.e., the best response function), each
country j maximizes Equation 2.1 with respect to tjks for each good k 2 f1; : : : :Ng. Therefore, once we change what is
given as the tari¤ rates of other countries, we can investigate various cases by considering the best response of a country.
For example, if we would like to calculate Nash tari¤ rates under the case of no trade agreements, each country will obtain
its best response function by taking the tari¤ rates of other countries as given in its welfare-maximization problem. As
another example, if a group of countries get involved in a free trade agreement (e.g., a bilateral trade agreement), we
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can set the given tari¤ rates between these countries equal to zero (consistent with Article XXIV of the GATT) and
calculate the best response functions of all countries accordingly in the welfare-maximization problem. We will employ
such examples while comparing the likelihood of having free trade agreements under di¤erent scenarios, below.
3. The Stationary Dynamic Tari¤Game
It is well known that repeated interactions between parties can be used to support payo¤s that Pareto dominate those
obtained in a one shot game. Accordingly, we consider countries playing an innitely repeated game for tari¤ rates
in this section. The repeated structure of the game gives more exibility to our model in terms of incorporating the
self-enforcement agreements. In this game, each country is able to compare future payo¤s out of a possible collusion
(cooperation) and out of a possible deviation from an FTA. 5
When there are no agreements (i.e., when there are Nash tari¤rates), country j gets a welfare ofWNj =Wj

tBjk; t
B
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

that can be calculated by inserting arguments (of tari¤ rates) that maximize Equation 2.1 back into it, where tBjk and t
B
kj
are the optimal Nash tari¤ rates between country j and country k, and tB( i)j (t
B
( i)k) represents the optimal Nash tari¤
rate of all other countries on good j (resp., k). In the context of a bilateral FTA, country js welfare when it makes a
bilateral FTA with country k is represented by WAj = Wj

tAjk; t
A
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

where tAjk and t
A
kj are the agreed tari¤
rates for good j and k (which are equal to zero in our paper since we focus on FTAs), respectively, and tB( i)j (t
B
( i)k) is
the optimal tari¤ rates of all other countries on good j (resp., k) that can be obtained by Equation 2.1, given tAjk and
tAkj . If country j cheats on country k, country j sets its optimal tari¤ rate on good k, t
B
jk, given t
A
kj , t
B
( i)j and t
B
( i)k;
i.e., country j maximizes WCj = Wj

tBjk; t
A
kj ; t
B
( i)j ; t
B
( i)k

. In this game, countries follow a grim trigger strategy, i.e., if
country j cheats on country k in a particular period, then, starting from the next period, both countries set their optimal
Nash tari¤ rates, and no agreement can be formed in the future.
We focus on sustainable FTAs. In order to sustain collusion in a trade agreement, the trade-o¤ between the gains from
deviating from an agreed-upon tari¤ policy and the discounted expected future gains from collusion must be balanced in
a way that the latter should keep away countries from deviating. That is,
1
1  jW
A
j WCj +
j
1  jW
N
j
5Although this paper investigates FTAs, which account for over ninety percent of existing agreements in the world (see Freund and Ornelas,
2010), the model of this paper can easily be extended to investigate custom unions by redening the welfare function and by determining which
tari¤ rates are taken as given in the calculation of best responses.
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where 0 < j < 1 is the discount factor of country j.6 Hence, country j cooperates if and only if
j
1  j

	j   
j  0 (3.1)
or equivalently
j  
j
	j +
j
where 	j is the one-period value of cooperation for country j, i.e.,
	j =W
A
j  WNj
and 
j is the welfare gain of country j from cheating to country k, i.e.,

j =W
C
j  WAj
In other words, for country j to have a cooperation, the minimum discount factor of country j should be:
j =

j
	j +
j
(3.2)
In our analysis, in order to talk about the likelihood of an FTA, we will consider the maximum of the minimum discount
factors across countries involved in that FTA:
 = max

j
	
for j 2 F (3.3)
where F is the set of countries involved in that FTA. If  increases (decreases), the range of the discount factor within
which an FTA is sustainable decreases (increases), and, hence, the likelihood of that FTA decreases (increases).7
In the context of a multilateral FTA, country js welfare when it makes a multilateral FTA is represented by WAj =
Wj

tA( i)j ; t
A
j( i)

where tA( i)j and t
A
j( i) represent the agreed zero tari¤ rates between country j and all other countries.
If country j cheats on a multilateral FTA, it sets its optimal tari¤ rate on good all goods tBj( i), given t
A
( i)j ; i.e., country
j maximizes WCj =Wj

tA( i)j ; t
B
j( i)

. In the context of a multilateral FTA, as in the bilateral FTA case, countries again
follow a grim trigger strategy; i.e., if country j cheats on all other countries in a particular period, then, starting from the
next period, all countries set their optimal Nash tari¤ rates to each other, and no agreement can be formed in the future.
In this multilateral FTA game, we will allow only one country to cheat for simplicity; therefore, Equations 3.2 or 3.3 can
be used to investigate both sustainable bilateral FTAs and a sustainable multilateral FTA.
6Having a unique discount factor across all countries would result in the very same implications; nevertheless, we keep them country specic
to show how each country is a¤ected in the repeated game in a transparent way.
7Although we do not use the concept of "likelihood" in a statistical way, one can easily use it in such a way by assuming that s have a
standard uniform distribution.
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4. A 3-Country-3-Good Example of the Stationary Dynamic Tari¤Game
We would like to pursue an analysis of counterfactuals by considering the e¤ects of trade costs, country sizes, and
comparative advantages on the formation of FTAs. Since the model is highly stylized (through simplifying assumptions
to have a tractable framework), these counterfactuals may not correspond to denitive policy analysis; nevertheless, they
will provide insight into the workings of our model, which is representative of studies based on self-enforcing rules in the
literature (as discussed in details, above).
In order to keep things tractable, we focus on a 3-country-3-good version of our model. We have two options in terms
of the presentation of counterfactuals; we can either present the policy implications of our model through closed-form
expressions or go one step further by parameterizing the closed-form expressions so that we can focus on the implications
of our model that are consistent with FTA observations in the data. We follow the second approach, because, given the
model, we believe that it is the only way to have relevant policy implications that are consistent with the real world.
Accordingly, we follow a hybrid approach by rst calibrating the non-policy parameters (i.e., parameters other than the
policy weights in the welfare function) without loss of generality and then by simulating/estimating the policy parameters
(i.e., WCS, WPS, and WTI) such that the implications of the model will match with the bilateral FTA observations in
the data.
4.1. Parametrization through Minimum-Discount-Factor Analysis
We start with calibrating the non-policy parameters of A, B, , j (for all j) and jk (for all j; k). Without loss of
generality, we calibrate these parameters such that (i) they satisfy the assumptions of A > 0, B > 0,  > 0, jk  0
and kk   jk > ( +B) (tjk +  jk); (ii) we have enough parameter space to perform di¤erent counterfactuals based on
changes in transport costs, country sizes, and comparative advantage; and (iii) we have a simple and tractable presentation
of the model. The benchmark values of calibrated parameters are given in Table 1, where  jks, js and jks are subject
to change during the counterfactual analysis.
Given the calibrated parameters, we estimate the policy weights of WCS, WPS, and WTI such that (i) the bilateral-
FTA implications of our model match with the empirical ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004; BB, henceforth) that are
consistent with 85% of the 286 bilateral FTAs existing in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97% of the remaining
1145 pairs with no bilateral FTAs, and (ii) the implied minimum discount factors js (calculated by Equation 3.2) range
between 0 and 1 to perform a healthy analysis. We achieve our estimation through a global grid search by considering
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every possible value for each of our policy weights (WCS, WPS, and WTI) between 0 and 1 by assuming, without loss
of generality, that their summation is equal to 1 (i.e., WCS +WPS +WTI = 1).
Getting into more details, recall that, according to BB, the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a bilateral FTA
are economically and signicantly higher:
1. The closer in distance are two trading partners.
2. The more remote a natural pair is from the ROW.
3. The larger and more similar economically are two trading partners.
4. The greater the di¤erence in comparative advantages (measured by capital-labor ratios).
5. The less is the di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW.
Therefore, given the calibrated parameters in Table 1, we search for policy weights (WCS, WPS, and WTI) that
are consistent with all of these empirical ndings. This requires connecting the concepts of distance, economic size, and
comparative advantage to the relevant concepts in our model. Accordingly, in our model, we connect distance to iceberg
transportation costs  jks, economic size to relative size of countries js, and capital-labor ratio to the comparative
advantage measures of jks. Using the calibrated parameters in Table 1, we achieve counterfactuals for each and every
possible value of WCS, WPS, and WTI between 0 and 1, and whenever our counterfactuals match with the empirical
ndings of BB, we accept the corresponding values of WCS, WPS, and WTI as our estimates.
Further details of each counterfactual analysis used in the estimation of the policy weights will be depicted in the
following subsections; nevertheless, for presentational purposes, we here depict the estimation results in advance. The
grid search results in WCS estimates ranging between 0.01 and 0.07, WPS estimates ranging between 0.71 and 0.77,
and a unique WTI estimate of 0.22.8 In more technical terms, these are the only values of WCS, WPS, and WTI that
result in the counterfactuals (that are consistent with the empirical ndings of BB) in Figures 1, 3 and 5 to be introduced
and discussed, below. Given the model and the calibrated parameters in Table 1, these "estimated" values correspond to
the average policy weights across countries in the sample of BB. As is evident, the policy weight given to the consumer
surplus is much higher than the other weights. In order to keep things simple, we will use the median of these estimates
in our investigation; i.e., WCS = 0:04, WPS = 0:74, and WTI = 0:22. It is important to emphasize that our results are
virtually the same if we use other estimated values of the policy weights, which are very close to each other anyway.9
8Since WCS +WPS +WTI = 1 and WTI = 0:22, having, say, WCS = 0:01 corresponds to having WPS = 0:77, and so forth.
9The implications of alternative estimated parameters can be tested easily by using to-be-published Matlab codes.
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4.2. FTAs and Transportation Costs
Our rst goal is to show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent with the rst two empirical
ndings of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then, we will
focus on the global welfare gains of possible FTAs through investigating the e¤ects of transportation costs on the globally-
sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements (to be dened below).
4.2.1. The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of transportation costs on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 1. The
exercise we have in Figure 1 is to increase the transportation costs between Country 1 and the ROW (i.e.,  j1 and 1j
for j = 2; 3) by keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (e.g., the transport costs between Countries 2&3 are
zero, 23 = 32 = 0 ). We measure the transportation costs as a percent of Country 1 source price of good 1 under no
trade agreements (i.e., Nash tari¤ rates).
As is evident, as Country 1 gets more remote, the minimum discount factor (i.e., , the maximum of the minimum
discount factors across countries) to have a distant bilateral FTA between Countries 1&2 or 1&3 increases, which means
that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a distant bilateral FTA decreases. This result is
consistent with the rst empirical nding of BB, above. The intuition is simple: Nash tari¤ rates (in the case of no trade
agreements) are higher for closer countries, because closer countries get involved in more trade between each other that
result in higher tari¤ incomes. Accordingly, if closer countries get involved in an FTA, their gain from reducing their
bilateral tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a remote country.
As is also evident in Figure 1, as Country 1 gets more remote, the minimum discount factor  to have a regional bilateral
FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a
regional bilateral FTA increases. This result is consistent with the second empirical nding of BB, above, and can again
be connected to the gains that can be obtained through reducing bilateral tari¤ rates between nearby countries.
4.2.2. Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
Although we have shown the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation across countries, we have not talked about
the best alternative (i.e., Pareto optimal) trade agreements that are globally sustainable. In order to do that, we will
focus on the global/world welfare dened as sum of the welfare of all three countries (i.e.,
P
jWj) in Figure 2 by using
the same parametrization as in Figure 1. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the welfare gains of the world dened as the
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one-period (which is proportional to lifetime) percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA. As is evident,
independent of transport costs between Country 1 and the ROW, having a multilateral agreement is always the rst-best
solution, while having two bilateral FTAs, with one of the nearby countries (Country 2 or Country 3) being the hub, is
the second-best solution from a global social planners point of view.
Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we can obtain globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements in
the bottom panel of Figure 2, which is another representation of Figure 1. Since this is the rst time that we are introducing
the concept of globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements, it requires further explanation in technical terms.
Specically, we take Figure 1, and we search for the welfare maximizing trade agreements among sustainable trade
agreements (or the case of "no agreement" if all the minimum discount factors are greater than zero) for each point in that
graph. For instance, since a multilateral FTA is the rst-best solution, the area above the minimum discount factor line
for a multilateral FTA in Figure 1 indicates the area of a multilateral FTA that is globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal.
Once the area above the minimum-discount-factor line for a multilateral FTA is assigned to a globally-Pareto-optimal-
sustainable multilateral FTA, we are left with two areas in the graph; one between the minimum-discount-factor lines for
a regional bilateral FTA and a multilateral FTA, the other between a regional bilateral FTA and the x-axis. Regarding
the former area, the welfare gains are higher than zero but lower than the gains from a multilateral FTA according to the
top panel of Figure 2; hence, this area will be assigned to a globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable regional bilateral FTA.
Regarding the latter area, it does not coincide with any trade agreements in Figure 1; therefore, this area will represent
no trade agreements.
As is evident at the bottom of Figure 2, higher transport costs facilitate regional bilateral FTAs, and lower transport
costs, in relative terms, facilitate a multilateral FTA from a social planners point of view. Unfortunately, a multilat-
eral FTA maximizing the global welfare for any transport cost is the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues.
Nevertheless, the di¤erent globally-welfare-maximizing FTAs have closer minimum discount factors as there are fewer
transport costs between Country 1 and the ROW. Hence, the existence of transport costs is one of the obstacles for having
a multilateral FTA according to this analysis, meaning that if we can reduce transport costs (e.g., through investing in
transportation technologies), the likelihood of forming a multilateral FTA will increase in a global context.
4.3. FTAs and Country Sizes
This subsection will rst show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent with the third empirical
nding of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then, we will focus
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on the e¤ects of country sizes on globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements.
4.3.1. The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of country sizes on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 3. For our
counterfactuals, we have to nd a way to consider both sizes (in magnitude) and similarities (in size) of countries at the
same time to test for the third empirical nding of BB. Accordingly, the exercise we have in Figure 3 is to increase the
sizes of Country 2 and Country 3 (i.e., 2 and 3) at di¤erent amounts (where 2 is depicted at the bottom x-axis and
3 is depicted at the top x-axis) by keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (e.g., 1 = 1). As is evident, as
Country 2 and Country 3 get larger and more similar economically (i.e., as they approach having exactly the same size of
2 = 3 = 2), the (global) minimum discount factor  to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which
means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. In particular, the left
of 2 = 3 = 2 in the x-axes show a higher likelihood of having a bilateral FTA when Country 2 and Country 3 get larger,
while the right of 2 = 3 = 2 in the x-axes show a higher likelihood of having a bilateral FTA when Country 2 and
Country 3 get more similar in terms of their sizes (independent of the magnitude of their sizes). This result is consistent
with the third empirical nding of BB, above, and can be connected to the high Nash tari¤ rates between larger and
economically more similar countries due to the having more trade between each other resulting in higher tari¤ incomes.10
Therefore, if larger and economically similar countries get involved in an FTA, their gain from reducing their bilateral
tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a smaller country.
4.3.2. Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
The top panel of Figure 4 shows the welfare gains of the world again dened as the one-period (which is proportional
to lifetime) percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA by using the parametrization as in Figure 3.
As is evident, having a multilateral agreement is again the rst-best solution for all considered sizes of countries, while
having two bilateral FTAs, with one of the large countries (Country 2 or Country 3) being the hub, is the second-best
solution from a global social planners point of view. Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we obtain globally-
sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements in the bottom panel of Figure 4, which is another representation of Figure
3. As is evident, lower country size di¤erences between Countries 2 and 3 facilitate bilateral FTAs from a social planners
10When we consider the case when the sizes of Country 1 and Country 2 are very similar to each other (i.e., when 2 is close to 1 = 1), a
bilateral FTA between these countries has the highest likelihood, which is another result supporting the empirical power of our model.
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point of view. As in the case of transportation costs, a multilateral FTA maximizing the global welfare for any country
size is the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues. Nevertheless, a globally-welfare-maximizing multilateral
FTA has a lower minimum discount factors as larger countries converge to each other in terms of their sizes (e.g., when
2 = 3 = 2). Hence, according to our analysis, the existence of country size di¤erences is another obstacle for having a
multilateral FTA, meaning that once countries will converge to each other in terms of their sizes (e.g., through catch-up
e¤ects that are mostly possible when countries are stable in terms of their economic indicators such as ination, nancial
development, and government size as highly documented by the growth literature), the likelihood of forming a multilateral
FTA will increase in a global context.
4.4. FTAs and Comparative Advantage
This subsection will rst show that the bilateral FTA implications of our model are consistent also with the last two
empirical ndings of BB under the calibration in Table 1 and the corresponding estimates of the policy weights. Then,
we will focus on the e¤ects of comparative advantage on the globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements.
4.4.1. The Minimum Discount Factor Analysis
The e¤ects of comparative advantage on the minimum discount factors to have a cooperation are given in Figure 5. In
order to show the consistency of our counterfactual with the empirical ndings of BB, we have to nd a way to consider
both di¤erences in comparative advantage among member countries and di¤erences in comparative advantage between the
member countries and the ROW (i.e., a way that will control for the magnitude of jjs while comparing their di¤erences).
Accordingly, the exercise we have in Figure 5 is to play with the comparative advantage of both Country 2 and Country 3
by di¤erent amounts, while keeping all other parameters the same as in Table 1 (including the comparative advantage of
Country 1 kept as 11 =  1). In particular, we start the comparative advantage parameter for Country 2 from 22 =  0:2
and decrease it to 22 =  2:2 along the way, and at the same time, we start the comparative advantage parameter for
Country 3 from 33 =  2:2 and increase it to 33 =  0:2 along the way.11 Therefore, we would like to have the minimum
discount factor  to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 having a concave shape in the following expression
11Hence, as we move from left to the right on the x-axis, (a) comparative advantage of Country 2 decreases, (b) the comparative advantage
of Country 3 increases, (c) the comparative advantage di¤erence between Country 1 and Country 2 increases, (d) the comparative advantage
di¤erence between Country 1 and Country 3 decreases, and (e) the comparative advantage di¤erence between Country 2 and Country 3 rst
decreases, then increases.
15
(adapted from BB):
j(11   22)j+ j(11   33)j
2
where jj stands for absolute value. The idea is to have a lower probability of a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3
when the (absolute) di¤erence between jjs of Countries 2&3 and jj for the rest of the world (i.e., 11) is wider. As is
evident in Figure 5, as we move toward the edges of the x-axes (i.e., as there are greater di¤erences across countries in
comparative advantages), the minimum discount factor  to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 1&2 or 1&3 decreases,
which means that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. This result
is consistent with the fourth empirical nding of BB, above, and can be connected to the high Nash tari¤ rates between
countries that have higher comparative advantage di¤erences due to high trade volumes resulting in higher tari¤ incomes.
In particular, if countries that have higher comparative advantage di¤erences get involved in an FTA, their gain from
reducing their bilateral tari¤ rates would be much higher compared to reducing their tari¤ rates with a similar country in
terms of comparative advantage.
As is also evident in Figure 5, as Country 2 approaches the same comparative advantage as Country 3 when 22 =
33 =  1:2 (i.e., when there are fewer di¤erence in comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that
of the ROW), the minimum discount factor  to have a bilateral FTA between Countries 2&3 decreases, which means
that the range of the discount factor, and, hence, the likelihood of a bilateral FTA increases. This result is consistent
with the fth empirical nding of BB, above. Notice that we do not see the discount factor having a lower value as the
comparative advantage of Country 2 or Country 3 (22 or 33) approach to the comparative advantage of Country 1 (a11);
this is because the magnitude of the increase in likelihood of a bilateral FTA due to the larger di¤erence in comparative
advantages (as we move toward the edges of the x-axes) is higher than the one due to having smaller di¤erences in
comparative advantages of the member countries relative to that of the ROW (as we move toward a11 = a22 or a11 = a33).
4.4.2. Globally-Pareto-Optimal-Sustainable Trade Agreements
The top panel of Figure 6 shows the welfare gains of the world dened as the one-period (which is proportional to lifetime)
percentage welfare improvements of the world from an FTA. As is evident, as we have closer comparative advantages across
countries (i.e., as we move toward the middle of the x-axes), having a multilateral FTA is again the rst-best solution,
while having two bilateral FTAs is the second-best solution, and having a bilateral FTA is the worst solution from a global
social planners point of view. Using the global welfare as our decision criteria, we can obtain globally-sustainable-Pareto-
optimal trade agreements in the bottom panel of Figure 6, which is another representation of Figure 5. As is evident, higher
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comparative advantage di¤erences across countries (moving toward the edges of the x-axes) facilitate bilateral FTAs, and
lower comparative advantage di¤erences (moving toward 22 = 33 =  1:2), in relative terms, facilitate a multilateral
FTA that is still the hardest to sustain due to self-enforcement issues. Hence, the existence of comparative advantage
di¤erences is another obstacle for having a multilateral FTA according to our model, meaning that once countries will
converge to each other in terms of their comparative advantages (e.g., through di¤usion of technology across countries),
the likelihood of forming a multilateral FTA will increase in a global context.
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal trade agreements through an innitely repeated-
game framework in a partial-equilibrium trade model considering transportation costs, country sizes, and comparative
advantages. There are three main contributions: (1) Given the model and calibrated non-policy parameters, we estimate
the policy weights on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income by considering the counterfactuals of the model
that are consistent with the empirical ndings of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) regarding bilateral FTAs; we show that
the weight on producer surplus is much higher than the others. To our knowledge, this is the rst study estimating such
policy weights in a model with self-enforcing rules. (2) We show that although a multilateral FTA is the rst-best solution
globally, bilateral FTAs are the agreements that are globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal for a wider range of parameters,
while a welfare maximizing multilateral FTA is globally-sustainable-Pareto-optimal only for very special cases (i.e., when
we have very high minimum discount factors); therefore, a multilateral FTA is hard to sustain due to self-enforcement
issues. (3) We show that transportation costs, country size di¤erences, and comparative advantage di¤erences across
countries all contribute to having bilateral rather than multilateral FTAs. Hence, in terms of global policy implications,
possible ways to increase the likelihood of a self-enforcing multilateral FTA are all based on reducing asymmetries across
countries: e.g., (i) to invest in transportation technologies, (ii) have underdeveloped countries to catch-up with developed
countries through pushing for their economic stability, and (iii) share technological improvements around the world,
say, through patent agreements across countries, or through encouraging foreign direct investments from high-technology
countries.
Nevertheless, our analysis is not without caveats. For example, we have considered common welfare weights on con-
sumer surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ income across countries for simplicity, but considering country-specic welfare
weights would result in richer comparative statics. In any case, such common policy weights are still very informative:
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Given the model and parametrization in this paper, the estimated policy weights correspond to the average policy weights
across countries in the bilateral FTA data used by BB. Therefore, they are consistent with internal political forces of
the considered countries on average. Since it would be hard to change such internal political forces through international
policies and/or negotiations, the success of forming a multilateral FTA (rather than bilateral FTAs) requires e¤orts that
are more than what an individual governments trade policy can achieve. This explains why trade agreements are brought
to international negotiation tables together with other political, cultural or historical benets/conicts. Therefore, in
addition to Limao (2007), who investigates preferential agreements motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues, future
research is required to focus on possible multilateral FTAs motivated by cooperation in non-trade issues.
Another caveat is that we have considered symmetric transport costs which are exogenously determined in the model;
as Panagariya (1997) has suggested, they may not be di¤erent than any other (non-tari¤) trade costs such as trade
frictions (e.g., exporting costs), cultural ties or networks. Hence, in addition to investing in transportation technologies,
working on eliminating trade frictions (as in gravity equations and/or as in Viner, 1950) or creating wider trade networks,
together with self-improving global culturalism through advancing communication technologies, may also help increasing
the likelihood of a multilateral FTA through time. Moreover, such non-tari¤ trade costs may be asymmetric as in Waugh
(2010) between rich and poor countries due to asymmetric trade frictions between them. Considering such asymmetries,
together with their interaction with country sizes and comparative advantages, remains as a future research topic.
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Table 1 - Benchmark Parameter Values and Variables
Calibrated Parameters Denition Benchmark Value
A Intercept of Demand 4
B Slope of Demand 1
jj Intercept of Supply with Comparative Advantage  1
jk Intercept of Supply without Comparative Advantage  3
 Slope of Supply 1
j Relative Size of Country j 1
Estimated Parameters Estimated Value
WCS Weight on Consumer Surplus in Welfare 0:01  0:07
WPS Weight on Producer Surplus in Welfare 0:71  0:77
WTI Weight on Tari¤ Income in Welfare 0:22
j Discount Factor of Country j Variable
j Minimum Discount Factor of Country j Variable
 The Maximum of the Minimum Discount Factors Variable
Exogenous Variables Denition Benchmark Value
 jk Transport Costs between Countries j and k 0
tAjk Agreed Tari¤ of Country j on Country k 0
Endogenous Variables Denition
Dji Demand for Good i in Country j
Xji Supply of Good i in Country j
pji Price of Good i in Country j
Mjk Imports of Country j from Country k
Wj Wealth of Country j
tBjk Best Response Tari¤ of Country j on Country k, given OthersTari¤s
tNjk Nash Tari¤ Imposed by Country j on Country k
	j One-Period Gain of Cooperation

j One-Period Gain of Cheating
Notes: "Variable" stands for values determined by di¤erent versions of the model.
  
Figure 1 - Transport Costs and Sustainability of Trade Agreements 
 
Notes: Country 1 is the one for which the transport costs of its exports and imports are increased. For each line, minimum discount 
factors have been calculated as the maximum of the minimum discount factors of the countries involved in the agreement.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Transport Costs, Global Welfare Gains, and Globally-Sustainable-Pareto-Optimal Trade 
Agreements 
 
 
 
Notes: The top figure shows the welfare gains of the world (calculated as the sum of the welfare gains of the three countries) in a 
one-shot environment (which is proportional to lifetime welfare gains at a particular discount factor). The bottom figure shows the 
globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable trade agreements. Although the maximum (minimum) of the minimum discount factor has been 
set to 0.35 for presentational purposes, multilateral FTA (no agreement) is globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable for minimum 
discount factors between 0.35 and 1.0.  
Figure 3 - Country Sizes and Sustainability of Trade Agreements 
 
 
Notes: Country 2 and Country 3 are the ones of which sizes are increased. For each line, minimum discount factors have been calculated as the 
maximum of the minimum discount factors of the countries involved in the agreement.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Country Sizes, Global Welfare Gains, and Globally-Sustainable-Pareto-Optimal Trade Agreements 
 
 
 
Notes: The top figure shows the welfare gains of the world (calculated as the sum of the welfare gains of the three countries) in a one-shot 
environment (which is proportional to lifetime welfare gains at a particular discount factor). The bottom figure shows the globally-Pareto-optimal-
sustainable trade agreements. Although the maximum (minimum) of the minimum discount factor has been set to 0.33 (0.2) for presentational 
purposes, multilateral FTA (no agreement) is globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable for minimum discount factors between 0.33 and 1.0 (0.0 and 0.2).  
 
Figure 5 - Comparative Advantage and Sustainability of Trade Agreements 
 
Notes: Country 2 and Country 3 are the ones of which comparative advantage measures are changed. For each line, minimum discount factors 
have been calculated as the maximum of the minimum discount factors of the countries involved in the agreement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Comparative Advantage, Global Welfare Gains, and Globally-Sustainable-Pareto-Optimal Trade 
Agreements 
 
 
Notes: The top figure shows the welfare gains of the world (calculated as the sum of the welfare gains of the three countries) in a one-shot 
environment (which is proportional to lifetime welfare gains at a particular discount factor). The bottom figure shows the globally-Pareto-optimal-
sustainable trade agreements. Although the maximum of the minimum discount factor has been set to 0.5 for presentational purposes, a 
multilateral FTA (no agreement) is globally-Pareto-optimal-sustainable for minimum discount factors between 0.5 and 1.0.  
